Intellectual of Empire: Eric Dutton and Hegemony in British Africa

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This essay examines the career of Eric Dutton in five British African colonies from 1919 to 1952, with case studies of his work in Lusaka and Zanzibar. In analyzing Dutton’s career, I use a Gramscian conception of the role of intellectuals in creating colonial hegemony, against the backdrop of recent research on the relationship of geography to colonial discourse. Dutton worked and corresponded with key players in Britain’s African empire. He was a major force behind early urban-planning programs in East and Central Africa and author of four geographical books. Permanently disabled by war wounds, he was also permanently infatuated with the moral rightness of British imperial culture. A concern for geography’s professional relationship with, and the geographical legacy of, colonialism has emerged in recent scholarship on Africa, largely through studies of travel writing, fiction, and nineteenth- or early twentieth-century exploration geography. Later scholar-officials like Dutton sought to apply their knowledge to the shaping of spaces to serve the Empire’s direct and immediate needs in Africa, even while trying to win the hearts and minds of its subject peoples. Around Timothy Mitchell’s (1988) concept of “enframing,” I build an analysis of the spatial projects with which Dutton is most associated and show how Lusaka and Zanzibar were enframed by his plans. Through his publications and correspondences, as well as his seemingly omnipresent service, Dutton has an important legacy that has neither been articulated nor analyzed, one which points to the importance of contextualized biography for analyses of colonial discourse. I argue here for seeing Dutton as an intellectual in the service of colonial hegemony and its enframing spatial discourse, although the character of his agency exemplifies why that attempted hegemony failed.

Key Words: cultural hegemony, colonialism, Africa.

The only real answer to give to these people is an answer in concrete and bricks. . . . The only way of getting things right for the native, and keeping them right, is by cultivation of public opinion on the spot. If ever I am Governor (did I hear you say “God forbid?”), I will devote all my energies to improving the lot of the native in the small practical ways which go to make up life, . . . to providing them with the means of improving themselves in mind and body and to trying to make them believe, from what they see with their own eyes, that we are there to help. . . . There are to my mind two outstanding factors in this problem. The first is Rule. Unless . . . the natives are ruled firmly as well as wisely, we are bound straight for chaos. The second is Goodwill. Unless you do get the goodwill . . . you will never get the machinery to work properly (Eric Dutton to Joseph Oldham; Oldham papers, Box 5, 1930 and Box 7, 1931; emphasis added).

Formal European colonial rule lasted for less than a century across most of Africa, from the Scramble for Africa of the 1880s to independence in the 1950s and 1960s (Christopher 1983). Yet colonialism’s legacy in Africa is still quite vivid, in political, economic, cultural, and geographical terms. Indeed, the importance of the colonial legacy as a cornerstone for analyses of African current affairs across the humanities and social and natural sciences continues to grow (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Mamdani 1996; Leach and Mearns 1996).

Britain, in particular, has had a broad and deep legacy in Africa. Roughly from 1920 to 1960, the British held some form of control over a huge and nearly contiguous block of territory from Sudan to Swaziland, plus five West African territories and part of Cameroon (Christopher 1988). To some observers, this represented a “ragbag of territorial bits and pieces” (Hyam 1976:15), but in fact, there were numerous commonalities across territories. British rule commenced in these places with direct connections to the metropole’s requirements for industrial raw materials or markets and control over their procurement, and colonialists frequently and openly justified imperial control continent-wide in these broad terms (Oldham 1924:97–98; Mill

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1965:693; Havinden and Meredith 1993). Most eastern and southern holdings became settler colonies or labor-reserve areas for plantations and mines, while a colonial trade economy predominated in the western colonies (Amin 1972:504). Yet both zones experienced some version of the administrative formula known as indirect rule, a “decentralized despotism” through which parallel governmental structures (“Native” and “European”) coexisted (Mamdani 1996:18; Lugard 1922). The British personnel who instituted and maintained this system made frequent career moves throughout the continent, further ensuring the patchwork of a common legacy.

Establishment of formal British administration and implantation of settlements meant transformation of both physical and cultural landscapes. The systems of land control, extent and character of racial and ethnic identity, form of politics, structure of settlements, form and function of cities, organization of workday and workplace, and very means of existence changed radically for many African peoples. Given the spatiality of these transformative processes, it is unsurprising that geographers have studied colonialism’s effects for a long time. Transformation of the urban built environment as an outgrowth of the colonial moment emerges as a common theme in much geographical research on European colonialism in Africa, as in Asia or Latin America (Abu-Lughod 1967; King 1976, 1990; McGee 1971; Ross and Telkamp 1985; Yeoh 1996). Many geographers have sought the origins of inequities in African urban-development processes in excavations of colonial patterns (Dixon and Heffernan 1991; Rakodi 1987; Simon 1992).

Recently, geographers working on colonialism have been captivated by the literature of colonial discourse analysis. Colonial discourse analysts examine how colonialism’s agents constructed discourses, or “social frameworks that enable and limit ways of thinking and acting” (Kenny 1995:695) and thereby “enframed” many aspects of postcolonial development policy (Mitchell 1988:44; Crush 1995). Increasingly, geographers use studies of discourse to critically assess the historical relationships between geography and colonialism, both in terms of the profession itself and in terms of the spatiality of colonialism’s discursive tactics (Blunt 1994; Driver 1992; Nast 1994; Crush 1995; Leach and Mearns 1996).

The explicitly spatial dimensions of colonialism’s enframing process, as “a method of dividing up and containing, as in the construction of barracks or the rebuilding of villages” (Mitchell 1988:44), is of particular interest to geographers. Many recent studies of colonial discourse by historians, anthropologists, and literary theorists discuss conceptions of space and construction of society’s spatiality, but most only touch on the real, physical consequences of colonialism’s spatial discursive tactics or indigenous responses to them (see Young 1995; Said 1993, 1995; Noyes 1992; Pratt 1992; McClintock 1995). Mitchell’s (1988) concrete spatial discourse analysis of the colonizing process in Egypt is a marked exception. His work represents an important attempt to build a bridge between cultural geography’s rich tradition of studying the built environment for social meanings and the colonial-discourse analysts’ geographical or spatial turn (Yeoh 1996; Gregory 1994; Duncan 1990; Holdsworth 1993; Nast 1994, 1996). This essay is an effort to add a multi-country African case study to a still rather thin bridge-building body of work inspired by Mitchell’s study or others akin to it that combine elements of discourse analysis with studies of the actual “answer in concrete and bricks” colonialism produced (Cooper 1987; Wright 1991).

If we are to understand the discursive tactics of urban design under British colonial rule in real, concrete terms, we must know more about the urban designers. I focus here on Eric Dutton’s relationship with and influence on the character of British rule, colonial society, and the built form of two African cities. I do not approach Dutton as a glory-bound exploration geographer “whose adventures are ripe for biographical treatment” (Carter 1988:83). Indeed, at first glance, Dutton is rather more like the “marginal men” McCracken (1989:538) uses to “gain some insight into the shifting character of colonial relationships” in British Africa. Between 1918 and 1952, Dutton served in five African colonies (Lesotho, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and Zanzibar; Figure 1) as a clerk, private secretary, assistant chief secretary, and chief secretary. He authored four books with geographical themes (Dutton 1925, 1929, 1935, 1944a), but only one (1929) had any popularity or influence in the discipline. He therefore remained, in his own words, “in the shadow of power,” and never in its full glare. Yet behind the scenes, Dutton was a key fulcrum of British colonialism’s discursive tactics and its efforts to remake African urban landscapes.

Dutton corresponded intimately with Britain’s most powerful colonial administrators and analysts of African affairs throughout his career, in
friendships that literally helped articulate the discourse of colonial rule. This group included Herbert Baker, Cecil Rhodes’s architect, and Robert Coryndon, who had been Rhodes’s private secretary and who went on to serve as a governor in four colonies. Dutton’s lifelong friend, the Kenya settler-writer Elspeth Huxley, wrote the introduction to his memoirs (Huxley 1983). He corresponded regularly with Arthur Creech Jones, Britain’s Secretary of State for the Colonies in the 1940s and 1950s (Jones papers, various dates). Frederick Lugard, the creator of indirect rule, relied on Dutton for intellectual critique and field reports on colonialism during their two decades of correspondence (Lugard papers, various dates). Dutton and Joseph Oldham, head of the International Missionary Council and cofounder of the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures, corresponded so feverishly and at such length that, said Dutton, “they might almost be love letters, I read them so many times” (Oldham papers, Box 6, 1929).

Through his connections with this intellectual elite and through his love of architecture, rather than through high position or formal training, Dutton became an influential urban planner and power broker. Here I focus on his roles in the creation of Lusaka in Northern Rhodesia in the 1930s and the reconstruction of Zanzibar city in the 1940s and 1950s. I seek to interpret Dutton’s career through an analysis of the geographical dimensions of colonial discourse and through excavations of geography’s professional relationship with colonialism. Dutton belonged in the realm of the British empire’s “functionaries” in Africa, meaning the “middle and higher echelons of the

Figure 1. Map of Britain’s African holdings between 1920 and 1960, showing the five territories in which Dutton served. Source: Produced by the University of Kansas Cartographic Services office, from data supplied by the author.
bureaucracy” directly engaged with Britain’s intellectual elite in strategizing the construction and maintenance of colonial rule (Gramsci 1971:13; Johnson 1992). His correspondences and actions give evidence of a pervasive conceptualization of British colonialism in Africa, by its functionaries and intellectuals, as a project of consensual persuasion paired with dominal force—in Dutton’s terms, from the quotation with which the essay begins, “Goodwill” and “Rule.” This conceptualization of colonialism’s operative principles gives rise to my main theoretical concerns. I will argue that British colonial discursive tactics in Africa, especially from the 1930s onward, were part of projects to achieve hegemony, which I take to mean the manufacture of “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (Gramsci 1971:12). The “cultivation of public opinion on the spot,” so fundamental to Gramsci’s conception of hegemony as power exercised through consensus rather than force, was, as Dutton wrote, to be built with “concrete and bricks.” I will demonstrate that the urban development projects with which Dutton was associated in Lusaka and Zanzibar were projects of enframing, in Mitchell’s (1988) terms, but ones which were meant to “win the hearts and minds” (Carruthers 1995:12) of Africans, albeit to a greater degree in the latter case. Geographical space became the physical language of both control and legitimation, most forthrightly in urban areas, and most cogently later in the colonial period.

It is useful to include both empirical studies because the character of the enframing hegemony changed with time and place, as did the degree to which “Rule” was infused with “Goodwill.” Dutton’s story provides an opportunity for seeing commonalities of spatial discourse and the exercise of power across British colonial Africa, while, at the same time, enabling an assessment of the importance of local differences between colonies. Although a form of indirect rule operated in both territories, Northern Rhodesia functioned as a copper-mining colony where Africans made up a labor reserve, and its new capital in the 1930s was built in the rural, sparsely populated midsection of the territory. By contrast, Zanzibar belonged more to trade-economy colonialism, and the project Dutton led there took place in a densely populated, closely built-up city with a prominent precolonial history (Sheriff and Ferguson 1991).

Dutton’s career is also a window onto what kept “the machinery from working properly” and kept most—though not all—of the Empire’s subjects from believing, from what they saw with their own eyes, that the British were “there to help.” Hence attention to his work highlights the ambivalence and imperfection in urban development planning, which both largely prohibited the achievement of hegemony and remained behind in the postcolonial societies, physically and socially.

The remainder of the essay is divided into five sections. The first addresses the literature of colonial discourse analysis, related work by geographers, and the concepts of enframing and hegemony around which I build my conceptual argument. A biographical introduction to Eric Dutton follows. Descriptions and analyses of Dutton’s work in Lusaka and Zanzibar compose the next two sections, followed by a section that compares the two cases and assesses his legacy as an agent of colonial enframing and hegemony building. My conclusion marks out the theoretical contribution this piece makes to studies of colonialism in geography and points to directions for future work.

The Concrete and Bricks of Colonialism

For something like forty years the idea of empire had gripped the mind of writers and proconsuls. It was a cult. . . . I nursed the thought that I was making a contribution (Dutton 1983:2).

Geographers have an expanding interest in social theory, cultural studies, and literary criticism. When this interest meets the discipline’s professional relationship with colonialism, it intersects with colonial-discourse analysts in the interpretation of geographical facets of colonial discourse (Kenny 1995; Bassett 1994; Jarosz 1992; Godlewksa and Smith 1994; Blunt 1994; Blunt and Rose 1994; Watts 1996; Crush 1996). In spite of a rising output among geographers dealing with colonial discourse and an increasingly geographical body of work by nongeographers, there is still room for further elaboration of this converging humanistic and geographical literature on colonial space. A close reading of Eric Dutton’s career can contribute to this elaboration in several ways.
First, many geographical studies within the colonial discourse genre emphasize eighteenth, nineteenth, or very early twentieth-century discourse, often linked to imperialist explorers and adventurers (Blunt 1994; Pratt 1992; Noyes 1992; Bassett 1994). This is an important focal point temporally because the science of geography had a tool-kit ideally suited to imperialist conquest, a connection that demands greater scrutiny than it has as yet received (Livingstone 1993; Driver 1992). Still, scholars of colonial discourse thus far have seldom looked to the apparently humdrum “politicians, soldiers and administrators” who followed these explorers during the height of formal colonialism in Africa for analysis of their discursive tactics or spatial impress (Christopher 1983). More than early explorers, functionaries and intellectuals of empire like Dutton sought to apply their knowledge to the shaping of spaces that would serve colonialism’s immediate needs in Africa. The varied contemporary vestiges of the colonial legacy in postcolonial societies are more redolent with their influences (Mamdani 1996; Bale and Sang 1996; Crush 1996; Stoler 1992; Thomas 1994). Dutton, for instance, helped shape the early careers of a number of independent Africa’s first generation of architects, planners, and politicians, a legacy that is more easily traced (and was certainly more face-to-face) than that of the early explorers.

Second, colonial discourse theory has turned increasingly to psychoanalytic approaches in attempting to assess questions of gender and social identity, but, perhaps surprisingly, has done so with little biographical detail (Bhabha 1984; Dawson 1994). The strong influence of Michel Foucault (1980) in many of these works is perhaps a causative factor in this absence of biography, given Foucault’s de-emphasis on individuals in the expression of power. Blunt’s (1994) work on the British exploration geographer Mary Kingsley, however, demonstrates the value of biographical treatments to the development of broader theoretical insights. Blunt (1994:59–60) borrows concepts from feminist literary criticism to argue that the carefully situated study of individuals not only teaches about the construction of identity but also “illuminates many discursive fields that are inseparable from wider matrices of power and authority.” Crush (1995:22) stresses that “individual biographies and autobiographies of the development experience” may help “contest the homogenizing power” of what he calls the “development machine” that establishes the framework for understanding what development means. In a more recent piece, he makes a similar argument for biography in analyses of the shifting character of colonial racism and its multifarious legacies (Crush 1996). From these works, it is evident that a thorough grounding of colonial discourse analysis in the actual landscapes and biographies of those who helped shape them can add immeasurably to the task of reminding us just where and how colonialism lingers. It can also challenge the occasionally homogenizing power and universalizing tendency of some colonial discourse analysis itself (as critiqued by Dirlik 1994 and Thomas 1994) by providing a picture of ambivalence, conflict, and contradiction in the expression of administrative power or urban-planning ideology.

Third, and most crucially, this study aims at a deeper elaboration of the concrete geographical aspects of colonial discourse. As Dirks (1992:19) remarks, colonial discourse “was effective precisely because discourse was not mere language.” Colonial frameworks for understanding and reconstructing African cultures involved more than words. The colonial discourse literature has made the useful step of highlighting the intersection of language with geography, through place-names and the naming power of colonizers or explorers as they “declare [their] presence” (Noyes 1992:112; Carter 1988; Said 1995; McClintock 1995). Geographers working on colonial discourse are careful to demonstrate that an equally significant and geographical colonial project consisted of the physical construction and reconstruction of space, and perhaps most markedly, urban space, after that presence had been declared (Nast 1994; King 1985; Kenny 1995). Cities and towns were built or rebuilt “to create, reflect and reinforce the colonial order” (Simon 1992:143). I call this construction of order the spatial project of British colonialism in Africa.

The spatial project involved utilization of architecture, landscape, and design features in political ways, the ordering of space in domestic and neighborhood environments, and the gendering of those environments, to further the “cultivation of public opinion on the spot,” that is, to make the populace accept British rule as commonsense reality. Young (1995:173) wants us to articulate the “violent way in which colonial practices were inscribed both physically and psychologically on the territories and peoples subject to colonial control.” After the initial campaigns of
pacification, the “repressive geopolitics of British colonialism” (Young 1995:173) in Africa were often more nonviolent and insidious. Institutions and rituals of rule were made to appear as ordinary and everyday by colonialism’s functionaries and were “crucial in entrenching the supremacy of the colonizer” (Yeoh 1996:11). Eric Dutton’s inscriptions of colonial practices, through his writings and through physical planning and other spatial policies, are only rarely (if ever) directly linked to any state violence. Instead, it is to more mundane and longer-lasting impacts that we ought to turn.

Mitchell (1988:45–62) identifies three broad, everyday spatial strategies for colonialism’s enframing order. The first of these involved altering African settlements from “orders without frameworks” to an order reducible to a segmented plan. Racial segregation was inherent within this orderly segmentation, but it was also meant to extend the effectiveness of routine health and sanitary inspections by colonialists, reinforcing the ordinariness of their power (Yeoh 1996). Second, colonialism’s spatial project in British Africa aimed to create a fixed distinction between inside and outside in domestic architecture, thereby codifying neighborhood, family, and gender relations in a manner distinct from African systems of domestic order. This fixity between inside and outside extended the first segmentation of strategy to various microscales. Third, the segmented plan of settlement forms under colonial rule provided a place from which the individual could observe or survey the city as a means of abstracting and objectifying the built environment. The often well-surveilled central spaces of observation served to distance traditionally rural Africans from the communal, “fused” conceptions of space with which they approached the city, thereby making a rational, western planning approach to urban space normalized in their eyes (Sack 1980; Cooper 1987). Each of these strategies, to Mitchell, became part of colonialism’s effort to separate “container” (the colonizing powers) and “contained” (the African community). These three conceptualized strategies identified by Mitchell epitomize the spatial text of the system characterized by Zanzibari Africans (in interviews with me) as “divide and rule” (Fereji 1992; Juma 1992). I will demonstrate the palpable presence of each tactic in the Lusaka and Zanzibar projects to which Eric Dutton is linked.

I consider this enframing process as a key spatial attribute of the effort by British colonial power to gain hegemony, in Gramsci’s (1971) definition of this term as manufactured ‘spontaneous’ consent. The applicability of Gramscian hegemony theory to the British colonies in Africa is often debated, since the structures of civil society and capitalist relations of production that would play a role in constructing Gramscian consent were apparently absent in many parts of colonial Africa (Vaughan 1994; Myers 1995a; Cooper and Stoler 1996). Those who read Gramsci as an extension of Marxist “class-theoretical” approaches reject his theory’s application to colonial Africa in the absence of clearly defined social classes there (Feiermann 1990; but see Glassman 1995:17; Myers 1994a). Moreover, some theorists see the legitimation campaigns of colonial states in spheres such as education, health, security, and urban planning as “more self-representation than day-to-day political practice” (Engels and Marks 1994:7). In spite of these critiques, for several reasons, I still see the hegemony concept as a valuable means with which “to suggest new ways of exploring and interpreting the past” (Engels and Marks 1994:3) in British colonial Africa in these cases.

Gramsci placed a major emphasis on intellectuals in articulating hegemony as a distinct expression of power from domineering rule. What he called “traditional” intellectuals (scholars, artists, and writers) were linked with what he termed “organic” intellectuals and “functionaries” (civil servants, politicians, and business leaders) in the process of transforming outright “domination into a variety of effects that masked both conquest and rule.” This linkage worked to create “the political capacity to generate consent” in British Africa (Dirks 1992:7; see also Johnson 1992:171). Gramsci focused on the importance of civil-society institutions as the bulwark of hegemony. As colonialism progressed, functionaries like Dutton were the key agents engaged in creating the institutions for their version of a “civil society,” such as those in Zanzibar, examined later in the essay. Gramsci argued that the “‘spontaneous’ consent” at the heart of hegemonic power “is historically caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production,” and its “intellectual and moral leadership” (1971:12, 57; italics mine). Dutton repeatedly expressed variations on precisely this theme: “the continuance of the Empire rests on the continuance of its prestige, and . . . all which exists in it for the good of the subject people
will come to nothing when that prestige no longer stands” (Lugard papers, Box 10, 1931, italics mine). For Dutton, what I call here the colonial spatial project was key to maintaining that prestige, constructing spontaneous consent through “the practical task of building in bricks and mortar” (Dutton 1983:119–20).

Furthermore, urban centers like Lusaka and Zanzibar were also the places in which civil-society institutions and capitalist relations of production predominated, often from an early moment in the colonial encounter (Mamdani 1996). Labor strikes along the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt coincided with the opening ceremonies for Lusaka after its construction in 1935, and a massive general strike paralyzed Zanzibar during the Dutton-led reconstruction of that city in 1948. Although neither strike had a direct tie to these building programs, both events are clear indicators that class consciousness ran rather high among the urban populace. Hence the objection to using Gramscian theory in Africa, due to limited class formation, seems rather moot in these contexts.

A Gramscian approach enables us to avoid seeing colonialism’s enframing project as a totalizing, calculated conspiracy. One often sees the ambivalence and ineffectiveness with which colonialism’s agents enacted this spatial project, and it took different forms in different settings (Frenkel and Western 1988). It is important to delve into colonialism’s history “not only to document its record of domination but also to track the failures, silences, displacements and transformations produced by its functioning” (Prakash 1995:6). More than a unidirectional and successful imposition, the “export of notions, systems, and practices which displace[d] indigenous forms or recreate[d] them in the image of the colonial power” faced negotiation, contestation, and reconstitution in colonial societies (Yeoh 1996:12). This negotiation and contestation, together with the partial extent to which cultural hegemony was “gained and continuously consolidated” (Said 1993:51), is enough in evidence at least in the Zanzibari case to say that the spatial project cannot be reduced to mere “self-representation.”

Finally, I seek to contribute to the colonial discourse literature by creating a balance between the local specificity of projects and broader connective tissue. I use the term project in discussing the Lusaka and Zanzibar cases to denote “a socially transformative endeavor that is localized, politicized and partial, yet also engendered by longer historical [and broader geographical] developments and ways of narrating them” (Thomas 1994:105). This definition’s link of local contexts to broader processes is important. More attention indeed ought to go to the local context, and even to the individuated agency within colonial projects. This is evident in the differences between the Lusaka and Zanzibar cases. A spatial problem with the demand for local context, however, is that those who shaped British colonial culture were on the move every five years, if not sooner. Wherever they moved, they took their discourse with them. Dutton’s writings betray the fact that he saw the “natives” as more or less the same “natives” whether he was in Basutoland or Bermuda1 (Dutton 1925; Public Record Office 1939). It was not only within the British Empire that these homogenizing processes occurred. More British administrators were fluent in French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, or German than were fluent in the languages of Africa, and so it is no surprise that colonial urban designers from different metropolitan states “borrowed ideas and styles from one another or from one colony to another” (Simon 1992:141). Dutton studied the correspondences of the French urban planner Hubert Lyautey and approvingly cited him for the watchful eye he kept, as a “strong administrator,” over his subordinates (Oldham papers, Box 7, 1935; Wright 1991).

Dutton’s paper trail and his work connect local contextual shifts in the colonial spatial project to the broader whole of British colonial hegemony in Africa. His story is useful in the search for a middle ground between universalizing a “colonial space” (Noyes 1992) and fetishizing a “local difference” (Thomas 1994). In order to see how, though, it is necessary to say more about Dutton himself, in the section which follows.

**Intellectual of Empire**

I am to blame for not having discovered sooner that I was enjoying the friendship of so great a master of English style (Joseph Oldham to Eric Dutton; Oldham papers, Box 6, 1930).

Since Eric Dutton spent more than thirty years as one form of secretary or another, it is safe to say that discourse literally comprised a large part of his career. Dutton’s four books and his unpublished memoir only hint at the marvelous facility for language displayed in his private letters and in colonial memoranda. His clever humor surfaces
even in drab circulars; his viciousness as a wordsmith made colonial-office personnel dread their “full dress meetings with the Major” (Public Record Office 1945). After all, in Dutton’s letters, enemies of his plans were not simply subjects of complaint; instead he averred that they should be “flung into a vat of burning sulfur” or some such punishment (Oldham papers, Box 7, 1934). That he put his formidable rhetorical talents as a “master of English style” to work more in the inner workings of colonialism’s hegemonic project than in his published works suggests the level of dedication and tenacity with which he approached its discursive tactics. As Huxley (1983:ix) said of him, “he occupied a position not merely to watch the wheels of government go round, but now and then to give them a gentle shove.”

Dutton’s early life and young adulthood clearly engendered both his skill with words and his indefatigable character. He was born in 1895 in Lothersdale on the Moors in Yorkshire, the eighth of nine children in a deeply religious, middle-class parson’s family. Eric schooled at Hurstpierpoint College Officers Training Corps and, briefly, at Keble College in Oxford, under the tutelage of A.S. Owen. Like his four brothers, Dutton aspired to a career in the civil service after a stint in the military. Eric’s parents nurtured what Smith (1996) identifies as “gentlemanly” English qualities in all five sons and stressed to all the children the importance of status, appearance, character, bearing, and education far in excess of any interest in finance or wealth. Dutton developed an abiding love of English literature (particularly Dickens and George Eliot), Greek and Roman imperial history, natural science, geography, and the propriety of dress codes, becoming a “master of English style” in more ways than one (Figures 2 and 3).

World War I ended his formal education before graduation, and nearly ended his life. Dutton served as a Major in the West Yorkshire Regiment, sent in with the “New Army” to the Gallipoli Peninsula in early August 1915 (Steel and Hart 1994:247–98). He suffered crippling shrapnel and bullet injuries and compound fractures in both legs near Suvla on September 21, 1915, a month after the most horrific fighting had ended and after most of his regiment’s other officers had been killed (Walker 1985:25–30). Operated on more than a dozen times over the next seven years, he experienced acute neuralgic pains in

![Figure 2. Eric Dutton (right), Palmer Kerrison, and Governor Robert Coryndon at Government House in Nairobi, 1924. Source: Papers of Sir Robert Thorne Coryndon, Box 14, Rhodes House Library, Oxford University. Reproduced by permission of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, from Mss. Afr. s. 633 Box 14/1 folio 1.](image-url)
both legs and in the spine for the rest of his life (Coryndon papers, 1918; Dutton 1983; Singh papers, various dates). After repeated surgery, hospitalization, and rehabilitation, he gained the ability to walk with crutches. He remained on crutches, in padded iron leg braces, or even in a chair for most of his career. He rarely walked without a cane or braces, even on good days.

During the weaker days of his colonial service, Eric often had to be carried in a chair by African porters. He found the carrying chair (in Swahili, machila) extraordinarily humiliating. Dutton (1983:3) felt that he "looked ridiculous . . . like a minor mandarin of the eighth grade" in his machila, a very different twist on imagery that shows white colonialists being carried by African porters to demonstrate colonial power (see the cover of Godlewska and Smith 1994). For Dutton, such porterage meant only vulnerability. He fought any impression of incapacity whenever he encountered it. Incredibly, he led several expeditions on Mount Kenya in the 1920s, very nearly becoming the second expedition leader to reach the summit (in the footsteps of the first, the geographer Halford Mackinder, in 1899), only to be carried back down in a makeshift machila (Dutton 1929). His model of the ideal colonial officer was someone who was energetic and, above all, present in the lives of those he served and ruled (Dutton 1944a). This meant he had to be exceedingly mobile to be good at what he did. For Dutton, this proved the greatest frustration of his career: "my infirmity resulted in there being yawning gaps in my knowledge" (Dutton 1983:85) of colonial development programs, political intrigue, and popular attitudes. It is my contention that his infirmity and the bitterness that came with it was a crucial part of what made him so "damned difficult" (Dutton 1983:126) to his superiors and underlings throughout his career, yet it also helped to make him more empathetic than most in the male elite toward those he viewed as powerless or in need (Kombo 1992; Zahran 1992).

Dutton served briefly as a temporary clerical assistant in Basutoland during 1918–1919 before having to return to England for more surgery (Coryndon papers, 1918). A year later, he came back to Africa as Governor Coryndon's unpaid private secretary in Uganda. He moved to Kenya with Coryndon's appointment as Governor there in 1922, and he thrived on the role Coryndon gave him as a go-between for the administration with a contentious and "unhappy valley" of white settlers (Berman and Lonsdale 1990; Youse 1986:171). After Coryndon's death in 1924, Dutton's (1983:104) "ambition was to stay in the shadow of power," and, after another round of hospitalization for his legs, he persuaded the new Governor, Edward Grigg, to retain him as a (still unpaid) private secretary. He worked for Grigg until 1930, living mostly off some war bonds, a modest pension, the generosity of his family, and the two Governors (Coryndon papers, various dates; Dutton 1983).

Dutton had much more power and influence in the newly proclaimed Kenya Colony than his low position and poor finances would suggest. Kenya in the 1920s was a playground of princes and presidents, and every official visit to the Governor gave young Dutton, as the arranger of all manner of affairs, a valuable introduction to the Euro-American world's rich and famous. Coryndon prized his opinion on any topic, and asked for it in written form nearly every working night (Coryndon papers, various dates). Grigg also entrusted him with matters well beyond his formal purview. Urban planning, housing, and architec-

Figure 3. Eric Dutton at work in the reconstruction of Zanzibar during the late 1940s. Source: Papers of Ajit Singh Hoogan, privately held, Zanzibar, Tanzania. Reproduced with permission of Parmukh Singh Hoogan, the architect's grandson.
ture formed the issues on which Dutton concentrated in both Uganda and Kenya, for both Governors. In particular, he helped create numerous land and planning policies in Kampala, Nairobi, and Mombasa.

Dutton's politicking on behalf of Coryndon and Grigg, both in Kenya and back in London, placed him in the inner circle of British Africa's elite, however much some of that elite may have desired to shoo him away. While representing the Kenya Colony in London, he began his friendships with Oldham and Lugard. Having the ear of the Colonial Office and knowing Dutton exceedingly well meant that Oldham and Lugard were in a position to advance Dutton's career and get him onto the colonial service payroll. Yet Oldham also saw Dutton as a danger to his hope of wrenching Kenya Colony away from the white settlers' interests (Oldham papers, Box 6, 1930). Thus he saw to it that when his friend was finally appointed, it was not in Kenya but in Northern Rhodesia, far from the action in Nairobi. It took Dutton some time to adjust to what he saw as his exile from Kenya, but the construction of Lusaka gave him a project that put his beliefs about the colonial order and theories of urban design into action.

Dutton first met the architect, Herbert Baker, through Coryndon in the early 1920s. Baker, who worked with Dutton in his designs for the Government Houses in Kampala and Nairobi, galvanized Eric's interests in architecture and urban design during their more than twenty years' friendship. Baker (1944:3), drew upon Christopher Wren's proclamation of the "political uses" of architecture ("it establishes a Nation . . . [and] makes the people love their native Country") during his long service to the empire. Baker (1944:103) called Dutton a "devout student" of Cecil Rhodes and described him as "understanding and sympathetic in all things pertaining to architecture in its widest implications as affecting the establishment of our civilization in the new, untamed countries." But I believe that Dutton's understanding of the political uses of architecture and design went further than a surface appreciation of symbolism and national iconography. Dutton was conscious throughout his career of the centrality of "giving the natives a square deal" (Oldham papers, Box 7, 1931) in any attempt at earning their "Goodwill," and he expressed the belief that the only way to do so was "to build upon the natives' own traditions" (Lugard papers, Box 10, 1931) in building matters.

This took him into the realms of the colonial spatial project, which dealt more palpably with the creation of spontaneous consent among Africans, potentially to territories beyond the making of a grand government house or fancy monuments. His two direct and lasting legacies in this regard lie in the bricks, mortar, streets, and trees of Lusaka and Zanzibar, and it is on these two settings that I now concentrate. My analysis of the Lusaka case is based on archival research conducted in the U.K. in 1992 and 1996, and on secondary sources. The study of Dutton in Zanzibar relies on both archival sources and interviews with older residents of Zanzibar from 1991 through 1997.

Lusaka: A “Tree-Lined and Well-Planned” City

In Zambia, Eric left a mark that has not been erased . . . in the layout of Lusaka. To a large extent Zambia's capital was Eric Dutton's brain-child" (Huxley 1983:iii).

The transfer of urban-planning ideologies and practices from colonizing powers to the colonies is an important recent theme in planning and urban geography. As Home (1990:23) points out, though, the actual "process of transfer" and the precise agencies and pathways of that process have received surprisingly little attention. Lusaka is "frequently cited as the first planned garden city" in Africa (Simon 1992:147). Its history has been well excavated from its origins in the ideas of famous British consultants through the story of how “the imported values of the colonial power were translated into the physical form of a city” (Collins 1977:227). Yet even in this case, where attention to the process of transfer of the garden city concept has been considerable, one crucial agent has yet to be examined. In published accounts of Lusaka's origins, the original planners and consultants are said to have had only a limited influence on the plans. A Town Planning engineer in the Public Works Department is credited with creating the actual layout of the city, and the government is said to have been forced "to rely instead on [the] Secretariat" to oversee the building (Gann 1964:259; Rakodi 1987; Collins 1977). The Chief Secretary position (the top job in that Secretariat) was vacant for a significant stretch during the planning and construction, and when Charles Dundas came to fill it in
late 1934, in his words, “construction was so far advanced . . . that I did not occupy myself much with the business, leaving it to those who had handled it before my time” (Dundas 1955:169). The missing element in all of these accounts is Eric Dutton, the Assistant Chief Secretary who was “responsible for the actual carrying out of the program” (Public Record Office 1936).

The Northern Rhodesia colonial government chose Lusaka as the site for a new capital in 1931 with the assistance of British planning consultant S. D. Adshead. Its location roughly halfway by rail between the old capital at Livingstone on the Southern Rhodesia border and the mining towns that had sprouted in the 1920s on the Copperbelt in the north made it convenient both geographically and politically, since settler or mining interests in either area would not automatically control its development (Public Record Office 1934; Jules-Rosette 1981). The capital’s physical site was chosen via aerial reconnaissance flights and cadastral analysis in which Dutton played an important role. It had the distinct advantage of being nonalienated Crown lands, meaning it was owned by the state and unoccupied. It sat adjacent to the existing railway stop of Lusaka Township, but this was still a rather small settlement. These are key distinctions between the Livingstone case and Dutton’s future plans in Zanzibar, since the steps of the project in Lusaka with which he was most closely involved did not require large-scale removal, demolition, or reconstruction of African properties (Collins 1977).

Still, as Dutton (1983:132) himself said, it was surely “a strange idea” to build a new capital city in the midst of a severe, world-wide depression. He found the first two Governors with whom the plan commenced, James Maxwell (1930–1932) and Ronald Storrs (1933–1934), to be “odd choices” for the Governorship. Where Maxwell “ruled the country with a rod of iron”—a strategy the consent-conscious Dutton never accepted—Storrs “was assuredly lost in Central Africa. He was not there. He did not look as if he were there” (Dutton 1983:131, 137). Yet these two Governors were responsible for Dutton’s extensive involvement in the project from the outset. Dutton wrote a sixty-three-page memo to Maxwell strategizing how to build and fund the city project in March of 1932, but the plan died only a few months later due to the Depression. Dutton headed the government Financial Commission in 1932 charged with making cutbacks in government expenditures, and once it was clear that Colonial Office funds were not forthcoming for the Lusaka project, local funds became subject to these cutbacks.

When Storrs assumed the Governorship in 1933, though, he left Dutton “full freedom . . . to deal with public affairs” (Dutton 1983:142). Lusaka’s construction was the main public affair for which he wanted this full freedom (Dutton 1983:137). He had become obsessed with what he saw as the urgent task of “building up decent native towns,” but he found that when the Colonial Office corresponded with him about the new capital, “there is always a ‘but’ ” (Oldham papers, Box 7, 1934). “The reply to that is,” wrote Dutton, “there are no blinkin’ ‘buts’” (Oldham papers, Box 7, 1934). On six-weeks’ leave in London, Dutton lobbied heavily and successfully with friends at the Colonial Office to produce loans to get the project underway again (Dutton 1983; Public Record Office 1934).

The third Governor of Dutton’s time in Northern Rhodesia, Hubert Young, sent him from Livingstone to supervise Lusaka’s construction in late 1934, telling him to have it done by the King’s birthday (late May 1935). Young proved to be the first boss since Governor Coryndon for whom Dutton had deep admiration and respect. The new Chief Secretary, Charles Dundas, was one of the creators of indirect-rule policies in Tanganyika, and he showed potential to rein in the grip of his Assistant on the colony’s affairs. But Dundas was considered unsympathetic to the white settler and mining concerns that were the ultimate purpose of the colony. Dutton had earned a reputation for supporting settler interests in Kenya (Oldham papers, Box 3, 1930). The white “businessmen and shopkeepers” of the colony’s old capital and the Copperbelt cities opposed the plan to build Lusaka (Dutton 1983:132); Young told the Colonial Office that Livingstone’s whites took to calling it “Deadstone” in their bitterness over the loss of revenues and customers brought by the capital relocation (Public Record Office 1935). Dutton was a wise choice politically for Young to use in fronting the operation since he could and did assuage settler anger about Lusaka, even while he massaged the colony’s correspondence with his contacts in the Colonial Office to satisfy the scheme’s bankrollers (Public Record Office 1934).

Dutton recognized, reluctantly, that he was neither architect nor governor. Instead, he played the role of facilitator and, building on his contact with intellectuals and professional advisors alike,
he kept the project rolling while leaving other technical aspects to those with more training. He conducted the aerial surveys of the site with the main architectural consultant of the actual development, Jan Hoogterp, but admitted Hoogterp (another Baker protege) scoffed at his claims to architectural expertise (Dutton 1983:144). Beyond his overall supervisory role, the two specific portions of the Lusaka plan with which Dutton became directly involved from the design stage onwards were the construction of its African compounds and the layout of trees and gardens. Of these two focal points, the crucial one for analysis of enframing and hegemony is his work on the layouts of the African compounds, and especially what was called the “Governor’s Village.”

The plans for African areas in the new Lusaka vividly demonstrate each of Mitchell’s three themes of enframing. First, the plans transformed the spatial character of Zambian settlements that had an “order without framework” into defined portions of a segmented plan. Northern Rhodesia was a very diverse place ethnically, like most British African colonies, so it is dangerous to generalize about the spatiality of African settlements. Nonetheless, it can be said that Zambian settlements typically appeared to outsiders as “disorganized” (Jules-Rosette 1981:11). For instance, the already-existing township of Lusaka, dominated by Africans in population and in design, was typically described as a collection of “ramshackle buildings” (Copeman, in Hansen 1997:23). The shifting-cultivation agricultural systems common in the region had caused mobility to be a key component of settlement geography, and there were traditions of temporary or seasonal housing even before the development of male mine-labor migration made transience common (Moore and Vaughan 1994:113–15). Furthermore, female-headed households, matrilineality, matrilocality and households with extremely fluid boundaries of inclusion were commonplace phenomena on the settlement landscape (Hansen 1997). In place of these fluid

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**Figure 4.** The original layout for the new capital of Northern Rhodesia, with the Governor’s Village highlighted. Source: Produced by the University of Kansas Cartographic Services office, based on the plan as it appears in Bradley (1935).
indigenous orders, the new British Lusaka was to be a highly ordered city, segmented by race, class, and gender.

To the colonial administration, the new African layouts were considered an attempt to preserve “what is best in the traditional plan of the African village” (Bradley 1935:47). Yet these “African villages” were carefully placed within the larger plan of Lusaka. Racial segregation permeated the map, where, for instance, the poorest quality lands were set aside for Africans. The plan even wedged in the one higher-quality African area, the Governor’s Village, right next to the military barracks. The plan subdivided Africans by class into “senior and better educated people” in the Governor’s Village, “personal servants” in a separate African compound, and “others,” who were left out of any planned compound and instead consigned to the unplanned “old Lusaka” (see Figure 4). By so doing, this map also assumed that African residents of the planned areas would be more or less temporary urbanites whose only purpose in town was service to the administration’s personnel (Hansen 1997).

Since most servants were male, this fed into the plan’s gender segmentation as well. Dutton saw what was best in African village planning as its reliance on “the family unit.” Bradley’s (1935:47–48) commemorative volume on Lusaka’s construction leaves little room to wonder at how that family unit was gendered in British minds on the Native Side:

The compounds consist of several units of four huts, each unit, so to speak, looking into itself and divided by an appreciable space from its neighbor to preserve for each house-holder that sense of intimacy which he had . . . [and to preserve the] feeling that, however large the village, he was living in one clearly defined section of it and was concerned only with that section.

Dutton consistently spoke of the need to rely on existing architectural and design traditions, and he did stay somewhat true to this in the Governor’s Village and African compounds by utilizing local materials and local craftsmanship to construct houses designed to follow Zambian house styles (Public Record Office 1934). Yet, in the process, these house designs were placed in the neighborhood units of a “containerized” village structured within a masculine British worldview. In seeking to be “educative in the designing of the huts themselves,” Dutton and those working under him spatially remodeled the family units of Zambian villages into a form much more recognizable as an English nuclear family revolving around patriarchy (Bradley 1935:49; McClintock 1995). The householder was conspicuously male, and the unit was designed to protect his sense of intimacy. The outdoor kitchens were built to please the “modern housewife” (Bradley 1935:47–48; Hansen 1997).

Furthermore, if we examine the order within these villages of Dutton’s, we see very clearly Mitchell’s theorized enframing strategy of creating a fixed distinction between inside and outside. The units of the personal servants’ compound had “each unit looking into itself.” The “intimacy” afforded by this inward orientation implies a patriarchal dominance not unlike that which Nast (1994) has identified in the practices of female seclusion of the medieval palace of Kano, Nigeria, but one which was certainly uncommon in precolonial Zambia. The hedges Dutton planted between units spatially disconnected even the man of the house from the formation of any sort of politically improper and more broadly based urban consciousness. The ordinary compound was built with no central gathering places. The fixed notion of an inside and an outside to each compound unit “preserved the feeling that, however large the village,” the residents were “living in one clearly defined section of it” and were “concerned only with that section” (Bradley 1935:47–48).

The Governor’s Village did have a central gathering place beyond the hedges of each four-unit compound (see Figure 5). This becomes a part of Mitchell’s third enframing strategy, that of providing an observation point. The village layout was a series of crosses, each with “a well controlled beer hall” at its center, because “a modicum of beer” was deemed to be as essential to the African as to “the British working man” (Bradley 1935:49). The beer hall was to be well controlled, even to the point of serving watered-down beer, and thus the more privileged Africans would still be sober while under observation (Hansen 1997:40). Moreover, most of these centers in the Governor’s Village provided views of the adjacent Ridgeway on which the main government center was built. It was deemed essential for Africans to be able to see the Government House as frequently as possible: “Northern Rhodesia is a Protectorate in which the Africans outnumber the Europeans by a hundred and twenty to one. To them, this House and its great occasions will be the outward and visible sign at all times of the dignity
of the Crown" (Bradley 1935:44, emphasis mine). Although this observation belonged to Dutton’s associate, Kenneth Bradley, from his expressed admiration for Bradley’s book (Dutton 1983:152), there is no doubt that Dutton shared Bradley’s understanding of how the Governor’s Village open spaces were positioned as a spatial discursive tactic to preserve the “prestige” he saw as so essential to the maintenance of the empire.

From an African-oriented point of view, Lusaka’s planning has been criticized on a number of fundamental grounds. Practically speaking, colonial planners from the 1930s onward failed to plan adequately for the far greater African urban population, in comparison to European settlers, that the new city eventually attracted. The low-density land-use framework established in Lusaka from its beginnings also created far higher transport costs and inefficiencies than befit a city of its size and import (Collins 1977). Moreover, “the underlying ideologies of separate development . . . debased” whatever high-minded conceptualization of a “garden city” for Africa that may have been in the plan at its origin (Rakodi 1987:213). “The associated and parallel development of European and native” (Jellicoe 1950:8) was a basic premise of Lusaka’s spatiality from the beginning, with native interests clearly coming second. Dutton was a crucial party to the city’s development, and thus many of the assumptions, structures, and procedures that Rakodi (1987:212) identifies as central to colonialism’s detrimental legacy in the postcolonial urban-planning apparatus of Lusaka began, at least in part, with him.

Nonetheless, Dutton felt that the Governor’s Village and the Personal Servants’ Compound met with African approval. He told the Secretary of State that “for the first time in Northern Rhodesia, I have found natives enthusiastic about the accommodation which Government is supplying them” (Public Record Office 1934). He based this conviction on his belief that the house plans followed Zambian designs, but also on the beauty of trees and gardens available for residents’ enjoyment within a short distance of these homes. In his memoirs, he spoke with pleasure of his own return visits to the city particularly for the sight of the tall, mature avenue trees he had planted as young saplings (Dutton 1983:133). The beer halls indeed remained popular, and these gathering areas became centers for the government to show educational films and propaganda, or for people to stage dances, so there is a certain degree of legitimation subtly attributable to his work (Hansen 1997:36–42).

Yet Lusaka as planned by Dutton and the others was eventually overcome by an African city they had neither planned nor desired. Ultimately, much of the model area Dutton created was torn down by the independent Zambian government in 1965 (Hansen 1997:43). Dutton insightfully responded to the 1935 Copperbelt strike by saying that “both the Administration and the Police are sadly out of touch with the natives” (Oldham papers, Box 7, 1935). They were even more out of touch in Lusaka, for there a city was built with little regard for Africans, beyond the showpiece houses Dutton designed.

Dutton himself betrayed the sentiments that characterized this spatial project from the begin-

Figure 5. Detail of the sketch plan for the Governor’s Village in Lusaka, 1935. Source: Produced by the University of Kansas Cartographic Services office, based on the sketch as it appears in Bradley (1935).
ning. His admission to Oldham (papers, Box 7, 1936) registers his “doubts about the paramountcy of native interests: I simply do not believe in it. I believe in the paramountcy of the interests of my own people.” Hence, in spite of his stated belief that colonialists needed to show the “natives” that their interests mattered by building up a spatial and social order for them, at this early point in his career, that order for Dutton began with a fundamental assignment of the “natives” to a lower rung of opportunity and consciousness. Hence there is a distinct ambivalence in his own claim that the British were “there to help”: underneath the spatial project’s agenda of legitimation, the British were there to help themselves. This prefigured structuration of inequality in his thinking, and its pervasiveness in British colonial circles from Northern Rhodesia to London in the 1930s, show through clearly in how Lusaka was built.

By the time of Zanzibar’s Ten-Year Development Plan of 1946–1955, however, both Dutton and the British empire in Africa had reached a “turning point” toward the gradual Africanization of power and eventual decolonization (Pearce 1982). By this time, the functionaries of the spatial project would seem to have been more conscious of moving, once and for all, beyond showcases and toward building the structures of a civil society that would maintain some form of alliance with Britain and the West even after colonialism’s end. I therefore move to an analysis of the Zanzibar case.

Zanzibar: Winning the Confidence of the “Natives”

I often think, such is the vanity of man, that if I could have been another five years in Zanzibar we could have transformed the place. We did alter it a lot, didn’t we? (Eric Dutton to Ajit Singh; Singh papers, Major Dutton file, 1965).

Eric Dutton had considerable power in Zanzibar, more than he ever attained elsewhere. Under Zanzibar’s protectorate status, the Omani Sultan was Head of State, but this amounted to no more than a figurehead role. Zanzibar had no Governor; instead, a British Resident headed the colony, leaving most day-to-day affairs of the bureaucracy in the hands of a second-in-command, the Chief Secretary. That position was renamed Chief Minister in the last years of colonial rule and remains as such even in the current-day Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. Eric Dutton’s eleven-year tenure as de facto second-in-command is longer than any Chief Secretary or Chief Minister before or since. Because of the ill health and war responsibilities of his superiors, he frequently acted as British Resident and often had a far stronger grip on policy and local social relations than the Residents he served (Jones papers, Box 7, 1946–1950). The propitious political changes and urban development measures that he, more than any other single individual, created and enacted, have left indelible marks on Zanzibar—marks that have resurfaced with a vengeance in Zanzibar’s return to multiparty politics in the 1990s. He was still in the shadow of power even in Zanzibar, yet he himself has cast a much longer shadow.

Dutton’s “innermost” dream was to “have the responsibility placed on me to build in East Africa” (Oldham papers, Box 7, 1933). It was in supervising Zanzibar’s postwar development plan that he had his closest brush with that responsibility. This plan, which Dutton drafted in 1943 and 1944, before the war ended, was the most ambitious and expensive program of state intervention in society produced in Zanzibar before its 1964 Revolution. Most of the program involved remaking the city of Zanzibar, where about a third of the colony’s residents lived. With substantial funding from the Colonial Office, the Central Development Authority (or CDA, which Dutton created and ran) built schools, hospitals, clinics, and roads, mostly in or near the city’s elite Stone Town district. The buildings that currently serve as the city’s only public hospital and its two main high schools are among the most obvious legacies of the program. The plan’s centerpiece was a massive redevelopment of the city’s African neighborhoods (known collectively as “Ng’ambo,” or the “Other Side”), replete with a civic center, civic-management institutions and a council of representatives. “There is a ten years job waiting to be done here,” wrote Dutton (1944b). “Provided that it is done in a sympathetic and practical fashion, it will be well worth doing.” Dutton clearly viewed his regime’s legitimation as inseparable from the physical structure of the plan (Myers 1995b, 1997a).

Dutton’s overall program in Ng’ambo had three aspects. All of them bespoke his goal of “improving the lot of the native in small practical ways.” The first was a program to rebuild all African neighborhoods, ward by ward, with
standardized sizes and spaces. This program began with the construction of a model neighborhood on the edge of town (Figure 6). Ever conscious of the power of toponymy, Dutton chose the name Holmwood for the new area in honor of Frederick Holmwood, an Anti-Slavery crusader who died in Zanzibar in the nineteenth century (Myers 1996a). The British often justified their rule in Zanzibar, as in other parts of Africa, by placing reminders everywhere on the landscape of their role in ending slavery (Myers 1996b). Holmwood was designed to house most residents from the first area to be reconstructed, the neighborhood of Mwembetanga. Once the residents there had moved to Holmwood, the administration demolished Mwembetanga and rebuilt its houses to mirror Holmwood’s model layout. After these residents moved back in, the original plan called for removing a second neighborhood out to Holmwood, demolishing it, rebuilding it, and so on, until all of Ng’amo had been remade.

The second aspect of the redevelopment was the program of social and educational development through construction of hospitals, clinics, and schools. Although most were constructed in Stone Town, the sites were juxtaposed between the historically Arab, Indian, and European zone and the African zone of the Other Side. This not only made them accessible to Ng’amo residents; it made them visible and prominent on the landscape, since sites in the interior of the closely built Stone Town would have been hidden from view. Several important projects were placed in Ng’amo itself. One of these was the Ng’amo Girls School. This was linked to the housing improvement plan through a concentration on home economics and health in its curriculum, including an on-site model home (Pilling 1943). Other segments of this second aspect of the redevelopment had their sites on either side of the Holmwood estates. The plan called for rebuilding the Police Lines, a manorial barracks campus just west of Holmwood, and Dutton’s regime constructed Zanzibar’s first and only mental hospital adjoining Holmwood to its east (Figure 6).

The third aspect of Dutton’s plan revolved around the construction of a civic center for the Other Side. The civic center was built on government-controlled residential land in the neighborhood known as Miafuni. As with the Lusaka project’s central area, government land control was perceived to speed the process of construction. Unlike in Lusaka, the civic center at Miafuni required demolition of more than a hundred homes to clear the site and a vehicular approach to it. Before doing so, Dutton’s CDA built Miafuni’s displaced residents a separate model neighborhood, this time on the western side of the Police Lines, named Mji Mpya [New City]. All the houses in Holmwood, Mji Mpya, and Mwembetanga had the same design. In the absence of a government architect, Dutton relied mainly on the skills of his pupil in urban planning, a local Sikh draftsman named Ajit Singh, who also designed the schools, hospitals, and police barracks. Under Dutton’s guidance in their routine “morning talk on architecture,” Ajit based his house design on “native huts” (Singh papers, Major Dutton file, 1952). The houses were constructed to improve durability, as in the replacement of the usual pole frame with a set of twelve reinforced concrete pillars. The homes in the three settings were laid out ten feet from one another on all sides, in even rows and arcs around a “village green.” The new areas were intended to “provide better examples of modern layout and housing” and “a real incentive to natives throughout the town to build on better lines” (Pilling 1943), but, Dutton claimed, without destroying Zanzibar’s customary domestic life. The example of good construction and alignment begun there was meant to be replicated in the rebuilding of
Ng'ambo as a whole, making for a more directly transformative agenda than Dutton had been capable of enacting in Lusaka.

This project, like the one in Lusaka, evidences the three broad spatial discursive tactics of enframing. Ng'ambo had been built from the 1850s onward as a “disorderly order” that manifested the power relations, religious faith, and social customs of its residents (Myers 1994b). Originally populated by the slaves and servants of Stone Town's Arab-Indian elite, the Other Side’s cross-word puzzle of alleyways represented an “order without framework” if ever there was one (Myers 1995c). Although colonial Zanzibar town had been the subject of one earlier planning effort by the Patrick Geddes-trained planner H. V. Lanchester, that plan had had little or nothing to say about Ng'ambo (Lanchester 1923; Myers 1994a). Dutton's project represented the first time Ng'ambo had been fully planned. Segmentation along lines of race and class again appear prominently in the spatial discourse of this project. Ng'ambo was cut up into a set of forty “Native Locations” based on aerial photographs and carved away from Stone Town, with the exception that the two predominantly black portions of Stone Town were placed in the “Ng’ambo Area Folder” of the Town Planning Board that Dutton ran. This Board created, in laws and codes, a clear line on the map, where little official distinction had previously existed, between African working class and Arab-Indian elite neighborhoods (Myers 1996a, 1997).

The orderly layouts of the new Mwembetanga, Holmwood, and Mji Mpya tracts had within them the second spatial strategy of enframing, that of a fixed distinction between outside and inside. Customarily, Ng'ambo house design entailed a rectangular, one-story, three- to six-room house (Myers 1994b). Most houses had an outbuilding with kitchen, toilet, and storeroom, connected to the main structure by fencing which delimited a small courtyard open to the sky. Although the houses themselves had something of an “intimacy gradient” between mostly female inner and mostly male outer rooms (Allen 1979:11; Donley-Reid 1982), in practice gender distinctions in domestic space were more flexible than any rigid topology of the gradient would imply. Historically, the spaces between Ng'ambo houses were small and irregular, but vibrant with both male and female residents’ activities. “You never feel the limit between the street and the house as something definite” in an old Ng'ambo neighborhood (Nilsson 1969:11). By contrast, the new neighborhoods of the postwar plan had regular spacing between homes, but also “party fences” similar to the hedge rows of Lusaka’s Governor's Village, separating each line of houses from the row behind it. This defined a separation between streets on the new road grid, principally and explicitly as a means of insuring more effective health department and police access to the newly remade areas (Zanzibar National Archives file AB 39/36). Fences also marked off Holmwood’s borders with the mental hospital and police lines.

Although Dutton expressed a desire to rid Ng'ambo of its “slum conditions,” the actual areas targeted were far from slum-like in character. By the Building Authority inspector's own records, the worst “hut” areas of Ng'ambo were in the neighborhoods of Mchangani, Mlandewe, Mwembeladu, and Gulioni (Taylor 1943). Thus the Dutton administration attempted to achieve legitimacy by proclaiming a project to improve housing and neighborhood health in Ng'ambo and by attacking the housing and health issues exactly where it was least necessary to do so. But the two sites of Mwembetanga and Miafuni were important for another reason: they were on Ng'ambo’s main rise and at its population center. Hence the third spatial strategy of colonial enframing comes into view, that of creating places for observation of the city and objectification of its plan. The Civic Center in Miafuni, which Dutton renamed Raha Leo [Happiness Today, the name the area retains even now], had a movie theater that was intended as a place for educational and propaganda films, not unlike the central hall of the Governor’s Village in Lusaka (Figure 7).

Although similarities exist between the projects in Lusaka and Zanzibar in terms of their spatial discourses of enframing, the Zanzibar project is distinct in one key respect: it faced direct African resistance. Internal opposition, especially from women, was manifested in each area of the project, beginning in Mwembetanga and Miafuni. Residents of Ng'ambo took to calling Mwembetanga “Poland” for its similarity in devastation to what they had seen in newsreel footage of that country in 1945—ironically, newsreels the Dutton administration showed them as part of its program of fostering civic education (Myers 1996a). Under the weight of local protests, the whole scheme seemed ready to unravel by March 1947, when the British Resident thanked Dutton for his work and asked him “to find a way out” so...
they could “cut [their] losses and drop the whole scheme” (Glenday 1947). The broad agenda that had been begun with great fanfare and enthusiasm as a program to radically change Ng’amo, both socially and spatially, virtually disappeared from view by 1950. No other neighborhoods besides Mwemetanga, Miafuni, Holmwood, and Mji Mpya were ever built or rebuilt.

How this spatial project came to naught is an insightful lesson in the pitfalls of Britain’s attempted hegemony in Africa. Part of the problem with the project related to its implementation at the heart of a “plebeian” community amid its self-generated political awakening (Glassman 1995). In the late 1940s, Zanzibar, like other African port cities, was convulsed in a wave of work stoppages and strikes. Many people from the neighborhoods slated to be demolished were labor activists or homemakers sympathetic to their interests (Pakenham 1949). But the immediate concerns of residents with the reconstruction project were not overtly political, nor did they link the strike to the project in any of my interviews. People were simply anxious about the size and quality of the new houses and very uncertain about their postreconstruction land tenure and title status (Mohamed 1992). Women were infuriated with what they saw as the poor standards of sanitation and construction in the courtyard and outbuilding areas of the project homes, especially as they had been led to believe that their new houses would be improvements on their previous accommodations. Their bitterest complaints concerned the party fences, since these cut them off from their backside neighbors, and neighborliness was a crucial feature of Ng’ambo’s “order without framework” (Ladies Committee 1949; Davies 1947, 1948; Myers 1994b). Pertinently, none of the grand spatial planning was accompanied by a rise in economic opportunities for Ng’ambo dwellers. The most “well-off” Africans in Ng’ambo, those on salary or with consistent day-labor status in the port or the government, still received a grossly insufficient salary for even basic needs (Davies 1947, 1948; Fereji 1992). As a result, what began as a project of legitimation ended with a shrug of shoulders: “their administration made decisions and they made maps, that’s it,” said one resident in an interview. “But really, under colonial rule, the citizens of Ng’ambo were not there, they had no say” (Mandrade 1992).
From the outset, Dutton’s main means of responding to residents’ concerns about the ten-year plan, and indeed their reluctance to accept colonial authority, was through development of civil-society institutions along lines that he saw as appropriate. His work in this regard is vital for demonstrating that British Africa’s late colonial regimes took seriously the need to “win hearts and minds” and were not simply interested in self-representation. His discursive response to the complaints from “Poland” is instructive. He suggested that “some measures should be taken as soon as possible which would convince the native population that the government is not gratuitously interfering with their long-established mode of living in accordance with the passing fancies of the authorities concerned, but is endeavoring to promote permanently their hygienic welfare and general enjoyment of life” (Zanzibar National Archives file AB 39/24). He called for the formation of educational groups led by the Women’s Welfare Officer that would teach women why the new houses were an improvement and how to maintain sanitary controls. He also asked Sheikh Juma Aley, a local pro-British politician of “Shirazi” origins (meaning an indigenous Zanzibar Islander in the political language of the times), to go on the radio to “counter misconceptions with truth” (Zanzibar National Archives file AB 39/24). In a Kiswahili broadcast coauthored by Dutton and Juma Aley, entitled “Why Ng’ambo Was Demolished To Be Built Again,” Aley explained Dutton’s project in ways that translated it into local sayings readily understood by Zanzibaris:

As many of you know the government has made it its true intention to repair the state of many things in Unguja [Zanzibar] over the next ten years. . . . It is a job that will take a long time and will cost a lot of money, but the costs of this job are outweighed by its benefits. Like the elders say, “a tree goes nowhere without a dolly to carry it.” . . . If many houses like this are built, the whole of Ng’ambo will be a pleasant sight to see, like trees and flowers in a garden please the eyes when planted well and in keeping with tradition” (Zanzibar National Archives file AB 39/22; my translation).

Dutton hoped that the “tree” of the proverb, the neighborhood consciousness of Zanzibaris, would be moved by the clever “dolly” of words, spoken as they were by one of the tree’s own leaves, Juma Aley. By taking Holmwood or the new Mwembe-tanga as “tradition,” Aley’s work clearly represented the “internalization of rational norms” by the people being ruled, a principle deemed central to hegemonic power (Chatterjee 1994:83). But this was only one small measure for the immediate issue of calming residents’ fears of demolition. The more important discursive response had to come within the civic center and the associations developed to use it.

Dutton wanted the civic center to serve as a focal point for the “demonstration of Government’s policy . . . a big stride towards winning the confidence of the extremely conservative-minded population” (Zanzibar National Archives file AB 39/24). At its opening ceremony on New Year’s Day 1947 (Figure 8), Dutton said of the center that “this building—in fact the whole of this little scheme here—is an earnest [sic] of what we are trying to do in Ng’ambo. . . . Here is not only betterment, but recreation and enjoyment as well” (“Opening of the Civic Center . . .” 1947:1). But nothing went right for the center from opening day onwards. The power failed on the first night at its movie theater, and persistent electrical problems led to a five-year legal fight with the operator of the projector. The roof leaked for two years, every time in different places.

The center was not simply a structural disaster. Its main public goal of fostering civic responsibility was enframed within a segmented plan of policy that doled out use-time for the facilities to ethnic “community” organizations only (Zanzibar National Archives files AB 9/47–9/49). The local government structures Dutton helped establish with the civic center displayed his calculated and contained notion of what civil responsibility meant. Although a Town Board had been in place for Zanzibar’s elite Stone Town section since the 1930s, it was only in 1944 that separate Town Councils were established for the two “sides” of the city: the Zanzibar Town Council for Stone Town and the Ng’ambo Town Council for the Other Side. “Town” meant Arab, Indian, and European; “Ng’ambo” meant African. Ng’ambo was overwhelmingly comprised of mainlanders and Zanzibari Africans. Yet the councilors Dutton appointed for Ng’ambo were never representative of the racial or ethnic community that lived there. His original Ng’ambo Town Council comprised two Africans (one of whom was Christian, while Ng’ambo was ninety-five percent Muslim), two Arabs, an Indian, and a Comorian, in addition to three official British representatives: eighty-two percent of the population of Ng’ambo (its African Muslims) were represented by just eleven percent of its Council. When the two sides’ councils were
eventually united in 1950, two more African representatives were added to the Ng'ambo delegation. This meant that four hand-picked Africans sat on a fifteen-member council at a time when Africans (excluding Comorians) composed half of the city population (Zanzibar Protectorate 1962).

Dutton divided appointments to the councils among the various communities of the city to solidify the alliances of interests between the British and their closest associates in power, the Arab, Comorian, and Indian communities. African appointments to council, such as they were, went to those most amenable to British interests, whether Christians, landlords or western-trained scholars. Dutton's stated goal for the town council was to have Zanzibar eventually become a self-governing, self-financing municipality. Actually, the town council, as well as smaller civil society entities (three Ward Advisory Committees in Ng'ambo, the Ng'ambo Town Improvement Advisory Committee, or the Civic Center Management Committee) had political utility but little autonomy or legitimacy in the neighborhoods. Only in the last years of colonial rule were members elected by the public, and even then constituency boundaries were carefully manipulated to maintain a council allied to British and Arab interests (Omari 1985; Mapuri 1996). The civic responsibility meant to be made manifest in the Ng'ambo civic center actually had its greatest impact in sowing the seeds of political bitterness and race-class hatred that exploded in the violence of Zanzibar's revolution in 1964, when as many as 5,000 Arab and Indian Zanzibaris were killed in a few days of brutal reprisal by Ng'ambo residents. One of the revolutionaries' central gathering places lay directly across the road from the Raha Leo-Girls' School complex.

Dutton was an awesome presence in Zanzibar; even fifty years later, older residents remember him well, with a mixture of sentiments. Joseph Oldham (papers, Box 7, 1933) once wrote to Dutton, "you have power and like power, which means that you are capable of doing Africa an immense amount of good or no end of harm." Some Africans have said, indeed, that he did them "an immense amount of good" (Zahran 1992). As Zanzibar's "political storm in a teacup" heated up, Ajit Singh (papers, Major Dutton file, 1960) told Dutton that "your wise administration of ten years ago" was sorely missed, and Singh was hardly alone among Ng'ambo or Stone Town residents in his admiration for the Chief Secretary. Several residents recounted to me Dutton's clear empathy with their financial struggles, and his efforts on numerous occasions to go out of his way to help the unfortunate (Kombo 1992; Issa 1992). Dutton was also widely disliked in Zanzibar, especially among the African employees of the Public Works Department whose work he...
so carefully scrutinized, because “he always had to have everything in order” (Dawaharo 1991). One resident said Dutton “was the Mwisho [meaning ‘The End’]. In those days the last word was always his” (Yahya 1992).

In Dutton's letter to Ajit Singh about the Zanzibar project, he asks, in an almost plaintive, wistful tone, “we did alter it [Zanzibar] a lot, didn't we?” He seemed puzzled that all those hospitals, schools, roads, and houses culminated, albeit indirectly, in a bloody revolution and not a cosmopolitan consensus. How could Britain's spatial projects, both in Lusaka and in Zanzibar, have been so far from creating the “Goodwill” Dutton sought? In the section below, I assess the broader lessons learned from Eric Dutton’s example through a comparison of his Lusaka and Zanzibar projects.

The Sultan’s Doorkeeper

Bwana Juma: Oh, Dutton! He took the best door in Stone Town and made it his front door in England!6

Me: Did he steal it?

Mzee Mohammed: He was the Chief Secretary.

Bwana Juma: Do you know what that means? He was the Sultan’s doorkeeper. You didn’t get to the Sultan without going through Dutton.

Mzee Mohammed: He had real power.

Bwana Juma: Heh, if he wanted to use the Sultan's yacht just to go fishing, he did it. And who's going to say he did something wrong? Me? Hah! Dutton, oh, very clever. An expert with words. You didn't want to be against him. But if you were with him, he did right by you (Jobo and Kombo 1992).

Eric Dutton’s manner of thinking was pervasive in the ideological self-construction of British colonialists’ purposes and intentions in Africa. Dutton, like many British colonial servants, genuinely believed to his dying days in colonialism as a morally and economically right system for Africa: “The rule of those days bestowed on all a greater measure of happiness and security than had ever before been known” (Dutton 1983:129). But “the rule of those days” rested on a fundamental misplacement of what Dutton considered the “will of providence,” which subjugated and exploited the very people it claimed to have primary interest in advancing. The “last word was always his,” as the last word always was in British hands under colonial rule. He was the Sultan's doorkeeper, and—figuratively, if not literally—he stole the door.

Dutton (1983:129) claimed that he was “always . . . concerned about the means of living of the town population” more than any other group or issue. The social (and political) construction of space and place in African urban areas served as his signature project for more than thirty years. Dutton, like many colonialists, professed belief at some level in the validation of local, African knowledge, such as in planning and building. Both in Lusaka and Zanzibar, he wrote variations on this sentiment: “I am convinced that the best and surest way . . . of making a real and permanent advance is to make improvement after improvement on the native design. If our model houses appeal to the native we have won half the battle” (Dutton 1944c). Colonialism, to Dutton, mixed Rule with Goodwill. Showing respect to local customs or tradition in matters like house style was an obvious means of demonstrating Goodwill, as was his pattern of empathy toward those with infirmities or in severe poverty.

Dutton himself acknowledged, though, that the projects of urban improvement to which he dedicated his life in Africa had not accomplished their key moral and political-economic objectives: “More might have been done for these friendly people. . . . But to me far the greatest of all was the failure to prevent the growth of slums. Then was the chance to strangle them at birth” (Dutton 1983:129). He went further to say that this “was all the more of a fault since the Africans’ own villages were often spotless” (Dutton 1983:129). If he and others like him at the functionary-intellectual intersection in British Africa, even at some level, admired the “order without framework” of African villages and recognized the importance of cultivating “public opinion on the spot,” then what accounts for such a consistent pattern of failure to achieve legitimacy or to implement what the British saw as effective planning measures?

If “half the battle” had to do with finding the right building materials or wall styles, while working to expand local craft industries, then Dutton’s work in Lusaka and Zanzibar can be evaluated as being on par with, and even an advance on, some postcolonial projects of urban development. In both cases, local African construction firms, carpenters, roofers, and building material suppliers warmed to the house styles used and gained footholds in local residential construction markets.
With the growth of both cities, the house forms of each project became widespread even in "squatter" areas—but without the enframing design of the model neighborhoods (Myers 1997a; Hansen 1997). These houses and the associated build-up of craft industries contrast positively with the housing and construction program implemented in revolutionary Zanzibar in the 1960s in terms of local cultural sensitivity (Myers 1994c).

But Dutton, like legions of colonial officials and apologists, lost the other half of the battle, to actually create hegemony by working with African interests in such a manner that they "saw with their own eyes" that the British were "there to help." The reasons for this failure are complex and broad, but there are some pervasive causative factors that Dutton's example encapsulates. The most central was, of course, the intrinsic racism of colonial space. In his memoirs (1983:194–95), he recalled long talks in Lugard and Oldham's homes in the U.K., saying "we thought of segregation as a system, not necessarily permanent, designed for social convenience, and certainly as one free from objectionable discrimination. As far as I remember, we never debated it for and against, or examined it in depth: we accepted it." But segregation was indeed examined in depth; it was a carefully constructed discourse of colonial culture. Dutton and Lugard corresponded for more than a decade with the main focus of their exchange centered on racial segregation. Dutton several times wrote of his regard for Lugard's assertion that "repugnance to miscegenation" is "a natural and purely physical instinct" (Lugard papers, Box 10, 1932). When, as was his custom with Dutton, Governor Coryndon asked him to offer an analysis of how to deal with Indian demands for land in Nairobi, Dutton responded, "I believe nobody wants an Indian to come and live next to him . . . and if we can prevent an Indian from living next to us, without treating him with injustice, then we should do it" (Coryndon papers, Box 3, 1923). Spontaneous consent consequentially depended upon convincing Africans, or Indians, to see segregation and attendant inequalities of urban services as the natural and common-sense outgrowth of the prestige of the colonizer. What they "saw with their own eyes" was more often that the British, like Eric Dutton, "had power and liked power," while they lacked what the British had as a direct result of the colonial system (Mamdani 1996).

It is important to remember the local distinctions between Dutton's projects in the contexts of Lusaka and Zanzibar. The former program sought to create a whole new city, the latter set out to remake an old one in colonialism's image. The former took place in a labor-reserve colony, the latter in a highly diverse and cosmopolitan trading center. Lusaka's construction came at a moment when the Empire still had supreme confidence in itself—so much so that it went ahead with a project to build a whole new city in the middle of the world's most severe economic depression. The Zanzibar project came as the empire was edging into its moment of doubt. The Lusaka program took place with Africans at arms-length, and the British failed to consider them in much beyond house design. In Zanzibar, Dutton sought from the outset to cajole and persuade Africans to collaborate: a tree goes nowhere, Juma Aley said, without a dolly; the Dutton regime clearly wanted to be that dolly.

Still, the projects had much in common, besides simply Eric Dutton's presence. The spatial tactics of enframing, and to some degree the actual patterns of neighborhood form, were much the same in the two colonies. The ambivalence behind Dutton's sentiment that the British were "there to help" was replicated in both settings. Although both projects dramatically changed the physical landscape, neither really had its intended social effects. To some degree, the professional attitudes or frames of reference for urban planners in both settings today remain heavily influenced by those established on Dutton's watch in the cities. For instance, the tendency to approach planning problems by thinking grandly, to come at the city with a "stupendous hammer to crack a few nuts" (Myers 1995b:1353), predominated in both cities at least through the 1980s, and this is a tendency that began in the two grand designs of Eric Dutton. Yet in spite of or perhaps because of the stupendous schemes, it is "orders without frameworks" that continue to be the primary planning engines of both cities, in the sprawling squatter areas surrounding them.

Conclusion

Recent work on the analysis of colonial discourse in the British Empire has stressed the importance of geography to the establishment of a framework of understanding and controlling colonies and colonial subjects. Many works concerned with Africa have emphasized explorers, and this is a useful focus given their significance.
to colonialism’s establishment. My intention in this piece is to extend the analysis to the middle and late-colonial period. Geography and geographers were also important to the later impress of colonial power, and the legacy of their impact has yet to be fully explored. A contextualized biographical focus, such as my interweaving of Eric Dutton’s words and actions on the urban landscape of British colonial Northern Rhodesia and Zanzibar, has utility in highlighting a number of discursive fields (urban planning, political administration, the culture of the colonial elite) all at once within colonialism’s expression of power, and in articulating local differences within colonial tactics. I have sought to use the biographical element to develop an appreciation for the need for balance between local differences and broader understandings.

Geographers are ideally positioned to contribute to the analysis of colonialism’s spatial discourse, and particularly the physical, material aspects of many discursive tactics. I have used Timothy Mitchell’s analytical construct of enframing, and its three central strategies, to draw attention to the spatial tactics of British colonial rule in building programs in Lusaka and Zanzibar. The three enframing strategies I have articulated in the programs in Lusaka and Zanzibar elaborated colonial rule’s spatial character. Britain’s colonial system functioned via a plan of segmentation, which these two projects took down to the level of neighborhoods and houses. Both projects incorporated the development of a fixed distinction between inside and outside for these neighborhoods and houses. Both sought to objectify the experience of urban space for Africans by creating central spaces where Africans observed the city and the world, and where they were under some form of surveillance or control while doing so. I contend that application of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, and particularly his emphasis on the roles of intellectuals and functionaries in fostering the consent of the governed, can contribute to our understanding of both why enframing tactics were utilized and how they were contested. Gramsci never meant for hegemony to be read as harmony, hence use of his concept helps to emphasize the ambivalence and contradiction within colonialism’s spatial discourse.

Neither the study of Eric Dutton’s life and work nor of British colonial geography in Africa are by any means exhausted by this piece. Cultural geographers ought to find much for critical analysis in Dutton’s published works, perhaps most of all in their photography. This is a theme I have barely touched here. There is more to be written on Dutton’s personal legacies, particularly his influence on figures like the local draftsman of his Zanzibar reconstruction, Ajit Singh. Singh worked in Malawi from 1965 to 1978 as a senior architect in Hastings Banda’s regime and as consultant from the Ministry of Works in the construction of Malawi’s new capital, Lilongwe. The first stages of my research project on Singh have shown, for instance, that Dutton got him this job in Malawi (Myers 1997b). The man whom Dutton called “the clever artist” hung his portraits of Dutton and Banda side by side in his living room in Zanzibar after his retirement there in 1978. If ever one doubts the immediacy of the colonial legacy in postcolonial Africa even in the 1990s, that living room wall convinces otherwise.

I have focused on Dutton’s relationships to the creation of colonial urbanism because these represent succinct moments in the spatial project of British colonialism in Africa. The spatial project was conceived of by its originators as a means for creating the consent of the governed, but it failed to do so from the outset because it could not “secure the collaboration and goodwill of the colonial peoples themselves” (Jones 1946:1) to accept assignment to the Other Sides of cities, literally and figuratively. Analyses of other geography-related functionaries ought to add greater nuance to our understanding of colonial communities and hegemonic projects, as well as their legacies.

Finally, the colonial legacy in Africa’s geography is continuing to expand as an important academic theme, even as it reemerges on the ground. An ongoing rebellion on Anjouan island in the Republic of the Comoros demands the return of French rule. The links of regional and ethnic strife in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo to colonial administrative and developmental policy are increasingly evident. Border skirmishes between Cameroon and Nigeria over a colonialistically fractured boundary line have erupted frequently in the past three years. These and many other phenomena remind us of just how long-lived and how spatial the legacy of colonialism is in Africa. This essay helps to see individual agency behind colonialism’s spatial projects and shifts in the character of those projects over time and place, yet it reinforces the common threads of colonialism’s geographical legacy.
Notes

1. Dutton served as Bermuda's Colonial Secretary from 1938 to 1942. As Acting Governor, he signed away the land to create a U.S. Naval Base there on the eve of the Second World War.

2. One brother died in the First World War and the other three served in Basutoland's colonial service at lower ranks than those attained by Eric in Zambia and Zanzibar.

3. The influential historian of East Africa, Reginald Coupland, found that Dutton spoke only "irritating nonsense" (Oldham papers, Box 3, 1929).


5. Hansen (1997:22) has recently criticized scholars of Lusaka's geography, planning, and history for the ways in which they "unwittingly privilege European interests" by leaving aside African conceptions of the city's history. Her point is well taken. But the present-day scope for such a subaltern view of Eric Dutton in Lusaka in 1935 is rather circumscribed. Even Hansen's use of two interviews with surviving African residents of 1930s Lusaka (both of whom were born in the late 1930s) to portray African views of the colonial city really provides only the smallest of sketches, and most of these two informants' memories are of Lusaka in the 1950s.

6. Although many Zanzibaris make this claim, it seems unlikely, since Dutton retired to Morocco and then Portugal. Ajit Singh helped design the house in Portugal and much of its furniture. No mention of the door appears in their correspondences about the house (Singh papers, Major Dutton file, 1945–1978).

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